Abstraction as a limit to semiosis by Wood, Tahir
Wood, T. (2013). Abstraction as a limit to semiosis. Semiotica, 197: 65-77 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/sem-2013-0080  
 
 
University of the Western Cape Research Repository      twood@uwc.ac.za         
 
Abstraction  as  a  limit  to  semiosis 
 
Tahir Wood 
 
Abstract:  
In highly evolved culture, discourse is made up of complexes of implicit and 
explicit intertextual relations, which form the meanings for new signifiers. 
Meanings for common abstract nouns are derived from the modeling of typical 
situations in everyday narratives. However at a further level of abstraction, 
models of discourses, which themselves contain abstract concepts, provide 
meanings for what are called “hyper-abstract” nominals. Here a certain limit is 
reached, and it is argued that this diachronic, onomasiological process provides a 
constraint on the notion of “unlimited semiosis.” This constraint has both natural 
and ethical aspects. 
 
1  Introduction 
This famous triad of icon, index, and symbol cannot be understood today as a 
taxonomy of three “kinds” of signs, as first suggested by Peirce (1894: §3). But 
instead of discarding it I would prefer to understand it as indicating three aspects 
of a sign, and my choice of the term triad, as opposed to “trichotomy” in Eco’s 
(1976) usage, recalls the triad of notes that together make up a basic musical 
chord. 
 
In human semiosis these three aspects of the sign are invariably co-present, while 
in the semiotics of other species the symbolic is either absent or very much less 
developed. In these species the operation of the index is innately specified to a 
greater extent, so that 
 
. . . unlike the mechanical operations of fixed, predetermined tropisms that are 
genetically hard-wired behavioral patterns belonging to animals and lower 
organisms, human drives are determinative. That is, they are endowed with a 
degree of freedom manipulated by the agency of the ego, an ego that operates on 
manifold levels of conscious and unconscious 
activity. (Mills 2004: 675) 
 
But a degree of continuity between the various animal species and the human 
should not be denied either, since “the human Umwelt is first of all an animal 
Umwelt, a species-specific objective world, but it is based on a biologically under- 
determined Innenwelt or modeling system” (Deely 2004: 20). It is the symbolic 
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order that in its own way fills out the space of biological under-determining 
mentioned by Deely. This will be explained using the zoosemiotics of René Thom. 
 
What I would like to demonstrate is that the symbolic order that enables human 
understanding, is defined paradoxically by a certain property, which, the more that 
it is realized, the greater its potential to lead to human misunderstanding. This 
property is abstraction. Thus, whatever may be understood by the term “unlimited 
semiosis,” there is one thing that it cannot mean, and that is rising abstraction 
without limit. 
 
2  The animal kingdom, the icon, and the index 
The iconic is that fundamental aspect of the sign whereby something is 
represented in a non-arbitrary manner. This includes such phenomena as the 
imprint in a plastic medium, for example, a footprint in the sand, or a reflection, 
such as a face in a mirror. But it is not always noted how it also includes the full 
range of phenomena of perception. Animal organisms have an inner 
representation of their environment, including a mapping of the surrounding 
territory. Features of the environment are imprinted, so to speak, onto the 
perceptual apparatus of the organism. This inner representation cannot be 
arbitrary if the organism is to survive; it must of necessity be iconic in nature, i.e., 
based on the principle of isomorphism, the core aspect of the “genesis of the image” 
(Thom 1983: 262). 
 
But not every image in the environment is particularly significant to the 
organism, or pregnant, in Thom’s terminology; only as an index does this become 
the case. The index includes the iconic aspect within itself, but adds the 
pregnancy that is absent from the iconic on its own. The index is based on 
associations, some learned and some apparently innate (“hardwired”), among the 
various objects of perception that are of interest to the organism. Such objects 
obtain their interest for the animal due to an association, for example the spoor 
that indicates the path of a pursued prey. Thom explains this association by 
saying that the index “is always an actant which is, or has been, in contact with 
its object, if it is not actually part of it” (1983: 267). 
 
There is a considerable distance travelled, however, in the evolution of the 
cognitive faculty in the process of hominization, resulting in much more complex 
expressions of meaning, including the fact that there can be a meaningful 
expression freed from the identification of a unique individual or stimulus in the 
immediate environment, so that “human language allows the description of a 
distant process (in space and time) and frees the mind from the tyranny of the 
‘here and now’ to which the animal remains subject” (Thom 1983: 275). It is in the 
symbolic realm that this becomes possible. 
 
3  The symbolic realm 
The symbolic is defined in terms of several related capacities: first, the capacity 
for a more contingent relationship between the signifier and that which is 
signified – we should not go so far as to claim, however, that such relations are 
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always and entirely arbitrary; second, the capacity to retain and distribute many of 
these signifiers differentially across various meanings (allowing also for polysemy); 
third, the capacity to manipulate and aggregate them in a wide range of 
combinatorial forms. Sebeok (1999) accounts for the emergence of the symbolic in 
terms of two stages: 
 
. . . language emerged as an evolutionary adaptation over two million years ago, in the 
guise of a mute semiotic modeling system – briefly a tool wherewith hominids 
analyze their surroundings – and was thus present in Homo habilis and all successor 
species. Speech, the paramount linear display of language in the vocal-auditory 
mode, appeared as a secondary exaptation probably less than 100,000 years ago, 
the minimum time required to adjust a species-specific mechanism for encoding 
sentences with a matching mechanism for decoding and interpreting them in 
another brain. The fine-tuning process continues. (Sebeok 1999: 92) 
 
The initial challenge for us is always to understand how it is that symbolic 
resources, including the vast resources of the world’s languages, depend upon and 
incorporate the iconic and indexical aspects of signs while going far beyond 
these. But then we must come to understand how the further evolution of culture 
brings new complexities into the web of semiosis that surely go beyond Sebeok’s 
seemingly modest notion of “fine-tuning.” 
 
So in hominization the iconic and indexical are somehow taken up into a new 
synthesis, the symbolic order. As Wildgen (1982: 20) puts it, “these aspects are 
ordered insofar as Index uses iconic principles and Symbol makes use of iconic 
and indexical devices.” A sign that does not go beyond the indexical principle is 
relatively immediate and concrete, even though it may be learned and even 
arbitrary like the sound of the bell to Pavlov’s dogs. 
 
Now where Thom explains the emergence of the abstract as the merging of 
territorial maps into one unified conception of space, thereby bringing about the 
unified ego in man, we might go further and understand, more generally, how it is 
that powers of abstraction make concepts, and hence the entire symbolic order 
possible. It is not just the fact that we can have a general notion of space beyond 
the maps of distinct territorial spaces that is decisive for the emergence of the 
symbolic, but rather that we can generalize any and every sort of phenomenon 
into a universal category or relation. Stjernfelt has this way of putting the matter: 
 
Higher animals may not only recognize tokens as instantiations of types, they may 
make use of these types to symbolize, to reason, argue, use diagrams. Probably, 
the special human privilege is abstraction, making it possible for us to make 
explicit and contemplate such types, reasonings, diagrams with any particular 
token placed in brackets and thus facilitating control, experiment, and quick 
development of these signs. (Stjernfelt 2002: 341) 
 
There is a consequence of this abstraction that is highly characteristic of the symbolic 
order, which is the power for various kinds of reflexivity. Among the things that can 
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be described by a universal category is any and every aspect of language itself; 
language is in this sense self-referential. Now I am aiming at something quite 
different here from the normal notion of metalanguage, whereby we use language 
to discuss language, as when one says What does this word mean? or How do you 
say this in German? and so on. Equally I am not alluding to a circularity of the kind: 
“Semiosis explains itself by itself; this continual circularity is the normal condition 
of signification” (Eco 1976: 71). These relatively innocent phenomena are perhaps 
well understood and may fall within an unproblematic notion of unlimited semiosis, 
one that does not sow the seeds of its own destruction, so to speak. 
 
I want to point out certain processes in diachrony that appear to lead inexorably to 
escalating levels of abstraction, the roots of which lie in the evolution of culture 
and which cannot develop without periodically undermining the basis of 
communication itself. Whether these point to some catastrophic fate for human 
beings and their language or to some millennial supersession of language itself (a 
leap into the post-human, or perhaps into telepathy, etc.), I cannot say. However, 
there is a logic at work that seems to me to be analogous to those financial 
processes that periodically wipe out large amounts of wealth on the stock market 
that suddenly turn out to have been nothing more than hot air. This analogy is a 
considered one, following Petrilli and Ponzio (2008), the idea being that linguistic 
products can be fetishized (like commodities) so as to efface the real human 
relations underlying them. 
 
I begin the explanation of this by drawing attention to the fact that we nominalize 
certain discourse processes in an onomasiological way. That is, the progress of 
discourse creates new meanings that stand in need of naming, of a signifier. These 
nominals become more and more abstract in their nature, insofar as their 
function is to summarize those parts of prior discourse that one wishes to evoke 
without having to repeat them laboriously. The recursive mechanism in language 
that gives birth to such processes is found according to Thom (1983: 176) also in 
mathematical discovery. He alludes to “a direct extension of this mechanism of 
symbolic creation” whereby “the mathematician sometimes sees an expression, or 
a relation, turning up again and again with an embarrassing insistence,” so that 
he will “introduce a new symbol to condense this expression into a single form and 
so continue the work on a new basis.” The new basis here is a higher level of 
abstraction. 
 
In the quoted passage Thom shows with great clarity how this recursion and 
advancement to new levels of abstraction occurs in relation to the semiosis of 
mathematics. The more general principle of abstraction is that a statement or set 
of statements is represented by a new sign or nominal expression. But then this 
new nominal itself enters into new expressions in its turn, thereby raising the 
level of abstraction. It is in these accretions of discourse that are nominalized and 
“profiled” (Visetti and Cadiot 2002) via abstract expressions that the full potential 
of the symbolic order, as well as its aporiae, are to be located. Just as Thom’s new 
mathematical form has a group of preceding others as its meaning, just so in 
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language more generally must we retrace our steps into prior discourse in order to 
find the original meanings of certain nominal expressions we use. 
 
Thom says that creating a new symbol like this “promotes a kind of tearing away, 
with the establishing of a new semantic field which will be the support of the new 
actant and so free the mental movement from the obsessional presences which 
impede it” (1983: 276). Just so with language in general; a new symbol arises 
which allows the mind to fly free of the obsessional particulars of its previous 
moments. But what we have added to this imagery of semiosis without limit (in 
this case abstraction without limit) is the caution that this freedom requires that 
we be able to trace our way back whence we came and to show others the same 
path, lest we forget what we mean. The ability, the opportunity and the will to do 
this, however, cannot always be taken for granted. To explain this further I need to 
say something more about how levels of abstraction arise. But let us note first the 
natural and ethical aspects of this. 
 
The natural aspect consists in the limits of mental capacities. Having performed 
the kinds of summative operations that give birth to the new symbol, one will tend 
to find a gradual atrophy in memory of some of the original processes underlying 
it, to the extent that these were even known by the individual in the first place. 
While this might not be the case in highly expert domains (such as the work of the 
professional mathematician) it may well be the rule in other domains of discourse. 
 
The ethical aspect lies in the highly differential ways that an abstract term might 
be profiled in discourse according to the intentions of the communicator. It is 
arguably part of the definition of semiotics that it deals with the capacity to 
deceive (Petrilli and Ponzio 2001: 39–41). This is not confined to the symbolic 
realm, but is observable across many life forms. However with escalating abstraction 
in the symbolic realm the potential for deception, as well as other less intentional 
forms of miscommunication, is vastly enhanced. And in all cases there is a certain 
“answerability” involved (Ponzio 2008). 
 
4 Semiosis and abstraction 
Abstraction has been shown to occur in at least three degrees (Wood 2006, 2009): 
 
1. Abstractiona: This abstraction is present in the derivation of the meanings of all 
categories, even those that we associate with “concrete nouns.” It is the process 
whereby categories of concrete objects or qualities are separated, by a process of 
idealization from the individual instantiations of the category. In cognition such 
categories can generally be simulated as image schemas (Lakoff 1987). As such they 
can also be demonstrated to a language learner through acts of ostensive 
definition: “that is a chair,” “this is a table,” etc. They also exhibit prototype effects, 
whereby one member of a category is a more or less central exemplar of the 
category than another, so that one does not generally teach someone the meaning 
of chair by pointing to a dentist’s chair or the meaning of table by pointing to an 
operating table, etc. This is the most fundamental level of abstraction, so much 
so that in common parlance it is not thought of as abstraction at all. This is because 
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of an unreflecting identification of a concrete object with the category. The object 
of reference is not abstract but the category is. 
 
2. Abstractionb: Here we have to do with abstract nominals of the common kind, 
words such as charity, disappointment, etc. The abstraction here is the process 
whereby an idealized narrative schema comes to form the meaning for a lexical 
item. These might well be identical to the “situation models” postulated by van 
Dijk and Kintsch (1983). A model of a common situation becomes, diachronically, 
nominalized, so that the meaning of the new signifier (if indeed it is entirely new) is 
provided by an idealization of the narrative of the common situation. 
 
Note that the abstract category that emerges in such a process does not correspond 
to any class of physical objects or their qualities and cannot be simulated or defined 
ostensively as in the case of abstractiona. There is no concrete object that can 
instantiate a category such as charity or disappointment. Nevertheless something 
remarkably like ostensive definition is possible. One may help to create the 
narrative schema by telling a little story and then saying “that is charity” or “that is 
disappointment.” The indexical is not used to indicate an object but the little story 
that has just been told. Thus categories at this degree of abstraction can be 
defined in a quasi-ostensive way (see Benzon and Hays 1990). But normally the 
matching of situation model with nominal will occur in a less explicit experiential 
way. 
 
– Abstractionc: This is hyper-abstraction. Hyper-abstract concepts cannot be 
demonstrated or defined through basic narratives (let alone through acts of 
ostention) without severe reduction of their meanings. Their meanings are 
constituted via bodies of heterogeneous discourse, the more heterogeneous the 
discourse that constitutes its meaning the more unstable the concept and the 
more likely that it will have different meanings for different interpreters. Here 
we might invoke Peirce and say that different interpretants may be active for 
different audiences, and we might also want to explore convergences between 
Visetti and Cadiot’s (2002) notion of “profiling” and Peirce’s notoriously elusive 
interpretants. It may just be that the former places more emphasis on the activity of 
the sender and the latter more emphasis on the activity of the receiver. 
 
5  The aporiae of hyper-abstraction 
A simple idealized narrative schema will not do for the meanings of the nominals 
that we are now concerned with. The problem is that the meanings of hyper- 
abstract words are defined by the various contexts of discourse in which the subject 
has encountered them, and this will vary from one individual to another. And any 
indeterminacies in meaning can also be exploited by the sender in the way that 
the concept is profiled in the text, that is, the way in which the concept is used to 
afford or block access to certain themes and topics. A successful profiling therefore 
means the reduction of a complex of semiotic potential to just those meanings 
that are associated with particular themes. 
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Consider a word like romantic for example. One might use this word without regard 
to the contexts in which one’s interlocutor has encountered it before. But the 
understanding of the interlocutor might vary greatly according to whether he or 
she has been exposed to, say, the chivalric romance, Byron and Shelley, 
Beethoven and Chopin, the gothic novel, and so on, as opposed to such popular 
genres as Mills and Boon love stories, detective fiction and Hollywood “romantic 
comedies.” Then there is the language of travel to exotic (“romantic”) 
destinations, types of restaurants that offer a “romantic evening,” etc. This 
dependence upon prior discourse is characteristic of hyper-abstraction. Unlike 
those abstractions of the second type, one cannot define romantic with any adequacy 
by means of a simple narrative schema. 
 
Notice that the problem is not simply one of polysemy, which in fact characterizes much 
of the lexicon. To understand a hyper-abstract word like this one must know which of 
the prior discourses it is summarizing or “standing-in-place-of” and what such a discourse 
typically consists of, its various symbolisms, assertions, themes and topics. Therefore we 
continually make judgments about the competence and knowledge of our interlocutors 
if we care about their understanding when we use such words, and it is quite impossible 
to separate language from knowledge in such cases, since certain linguistic items are 
precisely dependent on knowledge of discourses for their meaning. 
 
Once one has to do with hyper-abstract terms a radical indeterminacy in 
interpretation may arise, which cannot be remedied by recourse to any rules or approved 
procedures of interpretation. Thus any limitlessness of interpretation that we may be 
inclined to postulate may indeed turn out to be a “bad infinity”; bad in the precise sense 
that it represents the breakdown of common understanding and allows for a range of 
(mis-) understandings that are themselves potentially infinite in number, paradoxically 
creating thereby a kind of identity between meaning and meaninglessness in a single 
instance. Rather than the neat radial structure of prototype effects, or the “motifs” 
(Visetti and Cadiot 2002) that are easily stabilized in the profiling process, we have 
rather an uncertain meaning potential that is not necessarily stabilized according to 
context, but which remains unstable across the various readers/hearers, despite 
whatever profiling has been supplied by this context. The source of this is natural; it 
consists in the capacity constraints of long-term memory, as well as the impossibility, due 
to spatiotemporal constraints, of subjective exposure to all the possible discourses that 
are potentially able to furnish meanings of the word. 
 
6  The concrete imperative 
It is here that we should be concerned with what we might call the “semiotics of the 
deed.” If there is always a certain answerability in human communication then it is in 
the case of hyper-abstraction that it may become a particularly serious problem. We may 
use hyper-abstraction inter alia to impress, to deceive or to enlighten and we are ethically 
obliged at least to consider which of these we are engaged in. The serene lack of interest 
on the part of the speech act theorist towards the perlocutionary effect of one’s 
illocutionary act may in this light appear as a form of irresponsibility. Compare this with, 
for example, the concerns underlying McKenna and Graham’s (2000) discussion of the 
obfuscatory use of abstract nominals in technocratic discourse. 
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A macro-ideational structure that comes about intertextually (Wood 2006, 
2009), as a merging of the content of various texts into a summative cognitive 
structure that can be permanently stored in semantic memory, is a concrete 
process at the level of the individual and an ethical semiotics would be one in which 
such concrete processes are considered. A lack of consideration for the experience 
of one’s interlocutor perpetuates the key aporia in hyper-abstraction, where the 
concrete interpersonal nature of communication has been obscured by 
verbiage. 
 
The price that human beings pay for their symbolic capacity becomes apparent the 
more highly developed their culture has become, in other words the more hyper-
abstract terms it has generated. If this were not so there might never be a serious 
hermeneutic problem. “Cultures differ in their capacity to order and generate 
abstract concepts,” and “there are abstract ideas that cannot occur in the 
thinking of an Eskimo, or even a literate Florentine, or, for that matter, Darwin, 
Freud or Einstein” (Benzon and Hays 1990: 298). 
 
7 A diachronic logic 
This fate of subjectivity can only be conceived of as an “unlimited semiosis” if the 
latter is a bad infinity, that is, a semiosis that is indistinguishable from its opposite. 
This arises if we attempt to think of an infinity of interpretants, which is 
conceivable, but to what effect? If such an excessive plurality of meanings is 
accepted then this must surely be to admit the possibility of meaninglessness in any 
and every encounter. What if this very meaninglessness is what makes such 
words attractive to communicators whose purposes are not quite what they seem? 
This problem has long been there at the aporetic heart of the symbolic order – one 
thinks of a Socrates endlessly pondering over the meanings of abstract words 
such as justice, the good, and so on – and its appearance as a problem becomes 
more pronounced when subjectivity reaches certain crisis points in its maturity, 
for example due to increasing division of labor, or division between those who 
labor and those who do not. But it does not similarly arise as a crisis of 
subjectivity at lower levels of abstraction, which are based on substantially 
common experiences. Who cannot model the situations in which charity or dis- 
appointment are applicable? 
 
Rather than limitlessness then, let us consider the nature of the limit. In doing so 
we should bear in mind that hyper-abstraction is a reality and we should not claim 
that it could somehow have been avoided by a decision or by wiser counsel. What 
is being claimed instead is that it represents a limit that is internal to the language 
that we use, a limit that we may learn to master. Hegel says: 
 
A thing is what it is, only in and by reason of its limit. We cannot therefore regard 
the limit as only external to being which is then and there. It rather goes through 
and through the whole of such existence. The view of limit, as merely an external 
characteristic of being-there-and-then, arises from a confusion of quantitative with 
qualitative limit. Here we are speaking primarily of the qualitative limit. If, for 
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example, we observe a piece of ground, three acres large, that circumstance is its 
quantitative limit. But, in addition, the ground is, it may be, a meadow, not a wood 
or a pond. This is its qualitative limit. Man, if he wishes to be actual, must be-
there-and-then, and to this end he must set a limit to himself. People who are too 
fastidious towards the finite never reach actuality, but linger lost in abstraction, 
and their light dies away. (Hegel 1975 [1830]: §92) 
 
To “be actual” in relation to semiosis means, for one thing, to accept the limit that I 
have been describing. To ignore actuality in this sphere may indeed amount to 
being “lost in abstraction.” 
 
Despite the quantitative limitlessness of semiosis, which is entirely plausible, albeit 
“tedious” to contemplate (Hegel 1975 [1830]: §94), we need to postulate an entirely 
qualitative internal limit to the symbolic order. This is provided for us by the notion 
of abstraction. Abstraction defines the limit condition for the symbolic order in this 
sense, that it makes the symbolic what it is (i.e., something more than the iconic 
and the indexical), yet it is also what makes the symbolic turn back to the 
concrete, i.e., to the iconic and indexical, in order to re-establish, or to stabilize, 
meaning. To put it more simply, the symbolic is apparently quite distinct from the 
types of signs that characterize the animal kingdom, but in actuality it always 
carries the indexical and the iconic within itself as part of its own limit, that which 
it cannot leave behind entirely. 
 
“Unlimited semiosis” thus has this aporia within it: As soon as it has become 
unlimited, meaning will break down; and as soon as meaning has been restored, 
this implies that it must have become limited again. Applying a purely quantitative 
infinity here would mean a semiosis that is actually the opposite of itself, sheer 
meaninglessness. After all, our analysis of abstraction has already shown that the 
number of “interpretants” is potentially infinite and therefore unknowable to a 
subject. 
 
So from a logical point of view the problem with the notion of unlimited 
semiosis is that it does not make clear whether it is a qualitative or quantitative 
limit that is at issue. If it is taken in the sense of a purely quantitative 
limitlessness, it is easy to see how this would exhaust the mind and defy 
interpretation, even though it is imaginable. Such an infinite opposes itself 
absolutely to the finite (as its other). But a qualitative limit must prohibit such a spurious 
infinity if meaning is to be preserved and semiosis is to be based on actuality.  
 
In short, the concrete particularity of the iconic and the indexical must be found within 
the symbolic as its internal defining limit. In practice this is the concrete particularity 
of individual experience and memory, and the possibility of ethics in communication 
rests upon giving this concrete its due. 
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8 Conclusion 
One might characterize abstractions as summaries of stories. Hyper-abstractions would 
then be summaries of stories about discourses, where the original discourses may not 
be immediately available to provide a relative concretization for the understanding of the 
subject. To proceed to yet a higher level of abstraction than this could only be to leave 
the concrete entirely behind, no doubt a form of madness if it were possible. 
 
I have suggested, borrowing from Hegelian logic, that unlimited semiosis, taken in its 
purely quantitative aspect, arrives at meaninglessness, the inability of a subject to 
determine the meaning of an expression either for him/herself or for another. This is not 
to say that this infinitude is not operative in practice; it is, and where it is so it is bad. 
Insofar as one naturally turns back from such an abyss in an attempt to restore meaning, 
this infinity is revealed to be spurious. Obviously I have not attempted to explore this 
problem in all of its dimensions; I have focused on the question of hyper-abstraction. 
Escalating levels of abstraction may reach a point at which the subject is no longer 
modeling any particular type of situation at all, and must bring the discourse back to more 
concrete particulars in order to resolve the indeterminacy in meaning. The escalation in 
level of abstraction arises from the summarizing function of abstract signs – a function 
that may be confined to human language only – whose successful use depends upon the 
links that can be established between the present discourse and the prior discourse 
that is being summarized or recalled by the hyper-abstract term. 
 
No doubt we must postulate certain features of the evolved cognitive apparatus that allow 
the human subject to attain higher levels of abstraction, but also features that place a 
constraint upon this activity. Analogies can be found in other areas of language study, 
for example in sentence grammar, where the number of spatially distinct actants that can 
be organized around a verb tends to be limited to four, notwithstanding the prodigious 
syntactic complexity that this still allows for. 
 
Once we understand the problem of hyper-abstraction better, we will surely have 
obtained similar important insights into the capacities and constraints of cognition. 
What I am hoping to have provided here is a critical insight concerning unlimited semiosis 
and the problem of conceiving of this in practice as an infinite series of interpretants. 
Instead what appears to be needed is a better understanding of the limit, so that signs are 
seen as always in a process of becoming, each an (always partial) approximation to its own 
scope of applicability as determined by variation in subjective experience and thresholds 
of passage from meaning to non-meaning, or from comprehension to noncomprehension. 
The notion of interpretant, while apparently admitting subjectivity, tends to be postulated 
without due regard to this limit. I suggest that this might be a natural limit, but one with 
profound ethical implications. 
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